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7.1. Introduction: the land rush in sixteenth-century northern Italy 
 
During the early modern age substantial innovations emerged in the mortgage system that played a 
pivotal role in the development of the credit market. The first decisive stimulus came from rural 
areas around the middle of the sixteenth century when steady demographic growth, combined with 
the increased availability of silver coming from the New World, caused the price revolution that 
affected most European countries. The steep rise in crop prices and the ballooning of land values 
led on the one hand to a concentration of capital investment in the agricultural sector and to a 
general land rush carried out by the urban aristocracy and well-to-do farmers, and on the other hand 
to an increase in the pressure on small rural landowners. 
These effects yielded different outcomes. Nobles, patricians, well-off merchants and 
members of the elites in general started to divert their capital from commercial and industrial 
activities, then the most profitable, to agriculture. Land became very attractive for those who had 
financial resources and ambition to improve their economic and social condition. Indeed, land, apart 
from continuing to represent a status symbol and a means pursued by homines novi to climb the 
social ladder and become part of the urban oligarchy, was the emblem that exemplified the 
dynamism and entrepreneurship of powerful and active individuals (Roveda, 2012, p. 16; Lanaro, 
1992, p. 61). The increasing demand for land, as a consequence of population growth, led to the 
reclamation of new stretches of terrain that had once been barren, uncultivated or swampy.1 In the 
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second half of the sixteenth century, especially in northern Italy, large and important drainage 
projects were undertaken, which were accompanied by the introduction of irrigation systems, the 
building of artificial canals and in general by the improvement of the soil quality in order to gain 
new stretches of land and to increase productivity (Ventura, 1970; Ciriacono, 1994). In the Republic 
of Venice the land rush was paired with a parallel ‘water rush’ that manifested itself as a rise in the 
number of request for water concessions.2 The price of land rose consistently. In the dominions of 
La Serenissima in the mid-sixteenth century a marshy plot of land cost between three and six 
ducats; sixty years later, after being reclaimed, it could sell for 120 ducats (Bolognesi, 1984, p, 83).3 
This return to land that characterized the sixteenth-century economy has long been regarded 
in much of the literature as a sort of fall-back choice. The actions of the most industrious 
bourgeoisie who diverted redirected their investments from business, trade and manufacturing 
activities to agriculture have usually been interpreted as an attempt by the emerging upper classes to 
imitate a more nobilium lifestyle, passively settling for rents. Likewise, aristocrats who invested in 
land (labelled a safe haven asset by historians) have often been seen as acting passively, or as 
pushed by non-economic motivations. More recent research, however, has shed new light on the 
Renaissance land market, highlighting the entrepreneurial spirit that underpinned these new 
capitalist investments in the primary sector. This activity (aimed at improving real estate by 
enlarging properties) brought about the concentration of property titles in the hands of a few 
families of the urban elite, who were the protagonists of a process of redistribution and 
centralization of land ownership in the countryside. 
The vast estates of the prestigious families who were part of the patriciate were taking shape 
during the long sixteenth century. The D’Addas of Milan, a noble family that became enriched 
thanks to trade and merchant activity, boasted - in the second half of the sixteenth century - real 
estate holdings of 25,000 pertiche, the value of which amounted to one million lire.4 The Areses, 
who belonged to the Milanese aristocracy, had properties that totalled 11,000 pertiche. The 
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Serbellonis, with roots in the notarial and trade world, tried to climb the social ladder by holding 
public offices and obtaining control over notarial duties. Their social and political success was 
achieved through strategic marriages and by undertaking military and diplomatic missions. The 
family reinforced their prestige by expanding their estate. After buying a lordly palace in Milan, for 
81 million imperial lire, they started to increase their land holdings in the countryside. From the 
second half of the sixteenth century onwards they adopted a policy of broadening their patrimony 
through purchases, auctions, inheritance and dowries (Cerini, 1994, pp. 9-13). The Trivulzios, one 
of the richest and biggest landowner families of the city, had by the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries accumulated a patrimony of several thousands of pertiche that they had started to 
assemble in the fifteenth century both by force and legal methods. The land they possessed was not 
only extremely extensive but also the most fertile. This new high quality soil was obtained through 
works of improvement, like the reclamation of marshy lands, the removal of wooded areas, and the 
building of drainage canals and ditches. The methods they employed to gather such a vast 
patrimony were varied, namely purchases, and seizures from common good and from small 
landowners (Roveda, 2012, p. 114-126). 
There are many other examples of high-ranking families, like the Stampas of Soncino 
(Dionisio, 1997, p. 213), or the Melzis, Malingegnos, Caravaggis and Littas, who invested hundreds 
of thousands of lire to expand their holdings in rural areas (Bolognesi, 1984, pp. 78-79). The 
enlargement took place via different strategies, from the purchase of new plots of land, to 
inheritance (as is widely known, aristocratic families were very careful to prevent the fragmentation 
of their estates and made every effort to bequeath them intact for the heirs), and from exchanges (or 
permute, literally two parties exchanging plots of land) to the acquisition of the estates of insolvent 
debtors. 
Dispossessing insolvent mortgagors was a phenomenon with very ancient roots and was 
generally done through fictitious sales contracts, namely sales agreements that included a clause 
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stipulating that the seller could recover the real estate (‘cum pacto de recupera’) if he returned the 
money to the buyer. If the seller was unable to repay the loan, the purchaser would automatically 
become the owner of the real estate without having to go through auctions or draw up formal 
documents (Vendrame, 2009, p. 122). After studying the economic structure of the Paduan 
countryside in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Silvana Collodo concluded that ‘liens, 
mortgages and transfers to pay off debts created a continuous flow of property exchange powered 
by credit and by unscrupulous operations that modified the distribution of estates, creating and 
destroying wealth’.5 Studies of early modern economies likewise maintain that the concentration of 
landed properties occurring from the mid-sixteenth century was the outcome of a similar process 
(Corazzol, 1979, p. 50, Cattini, 1983, p. 126, Vendrame, 2009, p. 122).  
However, at present there is no robust evidence that the massive process leading to the 
creation of large estates during the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century land rush was due to 
confiscations of insolvent borrowers. Much literature has emphasized that the expropriations linked 
to mortgages featured mainly as an element of the ideological debate on the relationship between 
the city (where the rich lenders lived) and the countryside (populated by poor and exploited 
borrowers), but there is not enough quantitative data to enable us to make broader inferences. Gian 
Maria Varanini, for instance, who examined the financial condition of peasants and farmers in the 
Veronese countryside, stated that the transfer of land to lenders, through the expropriation of 
insolvent mortgagors, was neither an automatic process nor an inevitable event. In some cases the 
eviction could take a long time, taking place only after the rent had gone unpaid for many years. 
Moreover, sometimes landowner-creditors who wanted to keep debtors (often their tenants) under 
close control, chose not to push the borrowers to return the money. They profited from the 
borrower’s weakened position, making them do work for free such as digging, planting, or 
transporting agriculture goods (Varanini, 1987, p. 111; Lanaro, 1987, p. 210). 
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As a matter of fact, the general conditions of peasants were deteriorating by the mid-
sixteenth century in the Italian countryside; small-landowners in particular entered a troubled 
period. (Malanima, 2002, pp. 111-113; De Maddalena, 1992, pp. 43-165). Demographic growth 
during the middle ages had demolished the holdings of traditional farmers, dividing them among a 
growing number of heirs, and undermining the economic independence of small landowners. Such 
people were used to growing agricultural products that barely met the basic needs of their 
households. In these areas the circulation of money was scarce, and the only wealth families were 
able to produce was chiefly in kind, which they usually consumed immediately. Cash was 
necessary, however, to pay taxes, to pay for goods in the city markets, to cover unexpected 
expenses, and also to buy seed, farming tools and draught animals such as oxen or mules. The 
demand for credit started to increase particularly in the second decade of the sixteenth century. The 
interest rates on secured loans were calculated in currency, but usually paid in kind. The cost of one 
unit of wheat could rise or fall by one hundred percent from one harvest to the next. In March 1529 
in Arezzo, in central Italy, one bushel of wheat cost 128 soldi; five months later, after an abundant 
harvest, the price fell to 30 soldi. In the Pavese countryside people who borrowed five sacks of 
wheat, at a price of 420 imperial soldi each, had to pay back 10 sacks just one year later as a result 
of the drop in price (to 197.5 soldi).6 The interest rates paid in kind could reach 20 to 40% (Cattini, 
1983, p. 124). In 1546 the Marcuzzi brothers of Portogruaro (a village near Venice) pledged a plot 
of land for a 10 ducat loan, on which they had to pay an interest rate of two bushels of wheat. The 
price of wheat underwent such sharp fluctuations that the brothers ended up paying rent that, had it 
been monetized, amounted to 19.3% in 1546, 33.8% in 1550, 20% in 1553, and 38.7% in 1557 
(Vendrame, 2009, p. 121). As noted, rents and interest rates on loans were commonly paid in kind, 
mainly wheat, wine or oil. The combination of frosts and droughts that affected the hill country of 
Verona, Vicenza and Padua in the 1540s severely damaged olive crops.7 Those who had to pay their 
obligations in oil rebelled, and asked the Venetian Senate for measures to protect themselves. These 
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actions may have played an important role in the events that occurred in rural areas in the years that 
followed. The bad harvests of 1548 and 1550 also caused a rapid rise in wheat prices. In addition, 
the unexpected disasters that affected the countryside of the north at the dawn of the sixteenth 
century (due to the so-called ‘Little Ice Age’) brought about great fluctuations in crop market value. 
Small and medium-sized farmers in the Venetian Republic rose up and asked for interest 
rates from loans to be paid in money, instead of in kind, while the elites lobbied to keep remittances 
in commodities, which were inflation-neutral. Eventually, in 1551, the Senate of the Serenissima 
responded to complaints and requests from rural areas by issuing new reforms that imposed the 
payment in cash of leases and interest rates on mortgages entered into from 1520 onwards. The 
latter could not exceed a maximum cap, the amount of which would be set by the authorities in each 
city. The law was adopted in different years across the Venetian dominions. In Venice the interest 
rate on mortgages could not exceed 5.5%.8 On 19 May 1553, the Great Council of Verona set the 
ceiling for interest rates at 6%, the same rate used in Vicenza (1551), Bassano (1551) and Padua 
(1553). In Friuli the rate was 7% (Pedrinelli, 1768, p. 48). The higher interest rates were probably 
due to the greater shortage of capital in those areas (Corazzol, 1979, p. 71). 
Rental reform, aimed at protecting small landowners and farmers, was not a phenomenon 
limited to the Italian countryside, but a Europe-wide trend. Similar measures were undertaken in 
Denmark, England, France and Spain (Nelson, 1967, pp. 94-119; Schnapper, 1957, p. 119).These 
new norms did not put a stop to the charging of interest in kind; however, they contributed to a 
significant curb in rates, and paved the way for far-reaching credit innovations. 
 
7.2. The new success of an old credit instrument 
 
Between the tenth and sixteenth centuries, a wide range of different forms of instrument linking 
land and credit emerged under the stimulus of an expanding market and of the simultaneous 
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development of financial techniques. These developments helped place the Italian Peninsula at the 
forefront of Europe in this sphere (Felloni, 2008, p. 101). The different categories of instrument, 
which were described by terms that over time assumed overlapping meanings, essentially 
comprised two types of money loan: the census and the mutuum. 
The census was originally linked to a contract for lease of a plot of land or a building (such 
as a house, palace, or shop). The first kind of census was the c. reservativus, where the landowner 
gave his real estate (or more often a portion of it) to the lender and the interest (in the form of rent) 
was paid from the revenue generated by that property. In most cases, the obligation to pay rent to 
the original lender or to his heirs could last for generations and remained embodied in the property 
itself, until the principal sum was repaid by the initial owner or his successor. Loans at interest 
began to be banned in a strict fashion by the Church in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when 
usury became a byword for heresy. The charging of any amount, however small, which exceeded 
the sum lent was considered usury; this idea gave rise to intense debates that lasted for centuries.9 
Nonetheless, the form of loan described above was deemed legitimate (Felloni, 2008, p. 102). 
Beside the c. reservativus, another form emerged and became soon prevalent. This was the 
c. consignativus, which was designed on the basis of an ‘emptio cum locatione’, literally a sale 
followed by a lease. It was in effect a type of mortgage credit whereby the borrower (seller) sold a 
plot of land to the lender (buyer) and then became the lessee of the land, paying rent that was 
actually the interest on the loan. The agreement stipulated the seller’s right to reacquire the estate 
and indeed after a fixed term the borrower could buy back his property by returning the capital to 
the lender. The buyer promised to sell the land back to the seller, once he had returned the money, 
and the presence of this promise proves that this kind of agreement was not a simple sale, but a 
concealed loan. For instance, on 20 January 1591, Gio. Maria q. Iacobo from Lugo di Valle Pantena 
(in the Veronese countryside) sold a piece of land, containing willow trees, for 50 ducats to Paolo q. 
Sebastiano in Corrubio Stallavena.10 The contract ended with a clause that allowed the seller to 
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regain ownership of the land, after having returned the capital.11 This commercial (or more aptly 
financial) transaction could prove very risky for debtors, especially small famers. This is because, 
as previously mentioned, if the debtor was unable to gather the capital and repay it by the deadline, 
he might definitively lose the property. While during preceding periods the lender was usually 
inclined to renew the deed, the higher land values of the sixteenth century tended to make him more 
interested in gaining possession of the collateral, which was usually land. 
In addition to the census (in its two different forms), a second type of money loan, probably 
more ancient, was in use: the mutuum. The essential content of this contract was very simple: the 
creditor gave a sum of money to the debtor, who promised to return it in the same place and in the 
same type of coin, with added interest, that could be in kind or in labour. However, the agreement 
could not openly display the nature of the operation, because of the canonical ban on interest. For 
this reason, the writing underpinning the deal could assume various forms. Very often there was no 
mention of the interest rate; sometimes only the sum to be repaid was indicated; and at other times 
the agreement took the form of a sale of real estate which included the right of the debtor to regain 
the property once he had paid back the money (‘cum pacto de recupera’). In the tenth and eleventh 
centuries this contract always involved the pledge of a piece of real estate, which resembled the 
form of the pignus (Felloni, 2008, pp. 104-5). Yet, the instrument was substantially distinct from 
the c. consignativus because the pledged land did not remain to the use of the debtor, and 
consequently there was no payment of rent by the latter.12 
The remarkable spread of c. consignativus, which allowed one to bypass the interest 
prohibition via a ‘sale and lease’ transaction, focused attention from the early thirteenth century on 
the question of its legitimacy. As a consequence of this discussion, the c. consignativus was 
definitively regulated and reinforced in 1569 when the pope, Pius V, issued the bull Cum Onus 
(Placanica, 1982, pp. 210-14). This contract granted the creditor the dominium directum (‘right to 
direct’), while the dominium utile (‘right to use’) was ceded to the debtor, who continued to 
9 
 
cultivate the estate as tenant (Alonzi, 2011, p. 30). Thanks to the c. consignativus, which - as 
required by the papal bull - had to be drawn up by a notary, the borrower could ask for a loan by 
using as collateral a piece of real estate which could yield an annual rent that in effect constituted 
the yearly interest payment. The bull stated that in the case of the c. consignativus,‘the annuity can 
be constituted only if backed by real estate, which must have a revenue-generating nature and 
whose borders must be clearly defined in the contract. It must be created exclusively in exchange 
for cash, in the presence of witnesses before a notary and be put down in the public record, with 
honest obligation and at a fair price’. Moreover, the borrower was allowed to extinguish the annuity 
whenever he chose, by returning the capital to the lender, with two months’ notice.13 This 
redesigned version of the c. consignativus openly mentioned an interest rate, that had to be charged 
and could not exceed a maximum cap, which was set by the government14 
The most innovative and significant element of the c. consignativus following its 
remodelling in the 1569 bull was its redeemability and the right of the borrower to extinguish the 
obligation quandocumque (whenever) he wanted and was able to. Contracts usually stipulated a 
perpetual pact allowing the tenant and his heirs to extinguish the debt and be set free whenever they 
wished from the aforementioned annuity. In relation to this point, the debtor could decide when to 
close the contract. In essence, the restyled form of c. consignativus meant the rebalancing of the 
tension between lender and borrower in favour of the latter. 
In Verona in the second half of the seventeenth century, mortgage contracts of this type 
made up 90 percent of all loans transacted by notaries (Lorenzini, 2016). The agreement was 
divided into three parts: in the first (emptio) the debtor, technically the seller, sold his real estate  to 
the creditor, officially the buyer. In the second part of the contract (locatio) the borrower received 
the real estate back and in turn contracted to pay an annual rent to the lender which was tantamount 
to the interest rate on the principal sum that he had just received. The final part of the act laid out its 
redeemability, i.e. the possibility for the debtor to regain that part of estate if he paid off the debt.  
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Successively, in some territorial states of the Peninsula the setting of a deadline for returning 
the capital became very usual; the limit, agreed by the two parties, generally ranged from three to 
nine years. . So, if the borrower was unable to return the full amount, several scenarios could occur. 
First, the lender could come into possession of the collateralized estate, thereby executing the 
expropriation. Second, a debtor could be forced to return money and unpaid interest by giving a plot 
of land instead of grain or cash, according to a procedure known as datio in solutum.15 Eventually, 
if the debtor could not repay the money he owed, he could seek out a new creditor willing to finance 
him. In such cases, the notary played a critical role, helping the borrower find a new lender (most 
likely selected from the ranks of his customers) willing to offer finance (Lorenzini, 2016, p. 305). 
The notary very often played an active part in the arrangement of agreements, operating like an 
informal broker in credit markets (Hoffman et al., 2000). Overall, the new type of mortgage 
instrument legitimized the levying of interest on cash loans and, although some contracts included a 
fixed repayment deadline, it generally safeguarded borrowers by allowing them to extinguish the 
debt whenever they wished, and therefore removed them from the clutches of greedy lenders who 
aimed to seize the collateral, which typically was a cultivated plot of land (Bolognesi, 1988, p. 286).  
The framework of the census consignativus echoes that of the government bonds created in 
the Italian Republics during the middle ages. The emerging city states of Genoa, first, and 
subsequently Venice, Florence and Milan, were sucked dry by growing expenses. Frequent wars 
required large quantities of capital. In addition to taxation, in order to raise funds the cities had 
recourse to forced loans, and thus became indebted. Lenders (usually the wealthiest citizens) 
received high interest rates in exchange for their loans. The interest rates were paid with the yields 
from fiscal revenues. Governments considered indebtedness a temporary solution, but when wars 
started to become ever more frequent and require greater amounts of capital, forced loans proved 
insufficient, and new stratagems were devised. New forms of borrowing were made possible 
through the alienation of revenue-generating real estate that represented both the source of finance 
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and the collateral. In the same manner as government bonds, the census consignativus became a 
redeemable, heritable and tradable loan, as well as a method of payment that helped the credit 
market become more liquid and to expand (De Luca and Moioli, 2008). 
The Church’s interest in regulating lending activity can be partly explained by the fact that 
ecclesiastical bodies were some of the main actors in local credit markets and were among the most 
concerned with the legitimization of interest rate loans. Many of their assets, especially those of the 
regular orders and the female monasteries, were made up of capital that came from generous 
bequests, dowries and donations from the faithful. Religious institutions, far from wanting to keep 
money idle (inopia pecuniae) wanted to make it profitable, and one of the safest and most 
remunerative ways was by investing in the mortgage market.16 Mortgages were as safe as land, and 
easier to manage and more profitable. While land had a return of 3 to 5% at most, lending could 
yield between 6 and 7%, even 10% in Rome (Faccini, 1988, p. 113; Vaquero Piñeiro, 2007, p. 72). 
It was also more lucrative than investing it in the mint, or in the monti di pietà (civic pawnshops), 
which provided returns of 3 to 4% (Pezzolo, 2006, pp. 89-90; Lorenzini, 2016, pp. 49-50; Cattini, 
1983, p. 128; Borelli, 1974, p. 361). 
In addition, the censi soon became tradable and were able to support a kind of secondary 
market, as was seen in Florence at the end of the sixteenth century. The Medici Bank crisis in 1573, 
which lasted for almost twenty years, made it difficult to obtain credit and worsened the unstable 
condition of the industrial sector, especially wool manufacturing. This financial impasse, along with 
social and economic instability, led people to use the censi on a massive scale to overcome the 
hardships of that period. Similarly creditors who were in trouble and had signed censi began to 
alienate to other financiers their right to receive interest rates. 
All this contributed to the rapid spread of the use of censi across the entire fabric of society, 
not just among small farmers in tough financial straits, but also among those who had liquid funds 
to invest and decided to use it in lending activities, diversifying their holdings to include not just 
Commentato [GDL1]: We have added the reference in 
the references list 
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assets. Censi contracts became so widespread that they overshadowed all other forms of investment 
in Italian cities and were responsible for the remarkable increase in the recourse to credit across all 
strata of society.  
 
7.3. The versatile nature of censi consignativi: from a defensive instrument to a driving force 
 
Currently, quantitative data are not available to allow one to estimate precisely and assess the 
diffusion of the c. consignativus compared to the other instruments of mortgage credit. Yet the 
phenomenon was clearly widespread, and the fiscal sources in particular prove that the use of c. 
consignativi was becoming pervasive, especially from the end of the sixteenth century and during 
the two following centuries. It is also thanks to their use that credit became an increasingly 
characteristic feature of society in the Italian States. The c. consignativus underwent transformation 
from money loan into a negotiable instrument. In addition to creating a secondary market, this 
provided the credit system with resilience. This process was in effect possible because the 
instrument came to be used in ways not solely connected to land.  
 In the notarial records where censi credit contracts were normally registered, the specific 
motivation that drove the borrower to ask for a loan is very rarely mentioned. Drawing upon a 
survey of a thousand contracts concerning debts on landed collateral drawn up in Verona during the 
seventeenth century, the most frequent reasons given by debtors were the payment of arrears, the 
creation of a dowry for a daughter who was going to be married or enter the convent, the payment 
of taxes, and legal expenses (Lorenzini, 2016). Therefore mortgages were chiefly used for coping 
with necessities linked to everyday life, mainly basic or financial needs. The late seventeenth-
century economic system of Verona was recovering from years of hardship caused by the plagues 
of the 1630s, wars and famine, and thereafter the motivations that underpinned a mortgage began 
increasingly to be tied to production activities. The medium- to long–term duration of c. 
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consignativi (also called livelli affrancabili in some Italian States, such as the Republic of Venice, 
which was not aligned with the Pope)17 was one of their principal characteristics. Therefore those 
who wanted to carry out large and capital-intensive projects could benefit from the use of this credit 
instrument. Censi and livelli soon began to be used to open shops in the city, aimed at meeting the 
growing demand that resulted from population growth and the trend towards urbanization. In 
keeping with a phenomenon that was seen all over Europe, in northern Italy the Baroque age was 
also a period characterized by an increasing number of bakers, butchers, shoemakers and artisans 
who ‘conquered and devoured’ the cities and villages in which they settled, as Fernand Braudel put 
it (Braudel, 1981, p. 43). Likewise, in Verona, at the end of the seventeenth century the number of 
craftsmen, apothecaries and retail shops was slowly rising. The capital necessary to open a 
commercial retail activity was not especially high, amounting to about 200 ducats for a bakery and 
450 ducats for an apothecary (Lorenzini, 2016, p. 255-57). The livello affrancabile was very widely 
used in the Venetian mainland by merchants to finance their activities. For instance, Giuliano 
Piovene of Vicenza, for instance - the owner of a large estate, a renowned international 
businessman and merchant - used many financial tools to raise capital to fund his commercial 
activities, including livelli affrancabili (Demo, 2014, p. 117; Caracausi, 2007, pp. 294-95). Another 
major Venetian merchant and entrepreneur, Giorgio Sola, raised a total of 4,000 ducats through 
livelli to finance his businesses (Vianello, 2004, p. 181).  
Moreover, city councils resorted to debt (derived from censi or livelli) in order to fund 
extremely expensive infrastructure projects. At the end of the seventeenth century, after the Adige 
river violently broke its banks, the city of Verona needed to quickly collect a huge sum of money in 
order to repair the riverbanks destroyed by the flood. The capital was originally granted 16,000 
ducats at 4% interest by Francesco Manzoni, a nobleman from Padua.18 Some years later the city 
wanted to extinguish its debt. To do so it withdrew half of the sum from the city monte di pietà to 
pay Manzoni, and borrowed the other half from another nobleman of Verona, Earl Piero Zazzaroni, 
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who in those years was also a member of the municipal administration. Zazzaroni lent 9,000 ducats 
for ten years at 4%, in return for which the city pledged its butchers’ shops and ghetto houses. 
There was a significant use of censi by the municipalities in the countryside in order to 
cover growing expenses, much of which came from central governments that had to meet the rising 
cost of state building. The total debt, in censi consignativi, of the State of Milan’s municipalities in 
1636 was 27 million imperial lire (Faccini, 1988, p. 110). The recourse to censi, especially notable 
from the second half of the sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, was due to needs and urgent 
expenditures arising from an increase in the taxes levied by the state. The costs imposed by frequent 
wars and by the growing bureaucratic apparatus that would shape the modern state were reflected in 
the intensification of levies. In particular the cities, which had more independence when it came to 
setting their fiscal and lending policies and enjoyed greater bargaining power than the rural 
municipalities, were able to shift their tax burden onto small communities in the countryside.  
Up until the early decades of the seventeenth century the growing indebtedness of 
municipalities was not particularly worrying. They had large real estate holdings that could be used 
as collateral. Interest rates ranged from 6 to 8%, which were the same as market rates; achieving 
one percentage point higher or lower depended on the bargaining power of creditors and debtors. 
Financiers were normally members of the urban elite, or rather the most active members of it, such 
as patricians and affluent merchants. The financial state of local institutions worsened in the third 
and fourth decades of the seventeenth century; the most feared risk was that they would become 
insolvent, in turn reducing the revenues flowing into city coffers. This represented another element 
that could cause crisis and economic instability. The potential collapse of municipalities was 
addressed by central governments through the issuing of certain measures that set a ceiling for 
interests rates on censi taken out by local governing bodies. In the Venetian Republic the Doge 
issued specific laws in order to protect the growing obligations of rural villages and lowered the 
interest rate cap on loans drawn up by municipalities. In June 1673, the city of Verona issued a 
Commentato [CDB3]: Not April 1676? See endnote. 
Commentato [GDL2]: see correction 
15 
 
Parte (measure) stipulating that the interest rates of debts contracted by local administrations had to 
be lowered from 6 to 4.5%. The document reads: ‘the generous concession made by the Serenissimo 
Principe with the law of 10 June 1673, [enabled us to] take money through census at 4.5 percent, 
which must be free from tax and which will serve to extinguish previous debts (censi) at 6 percent, 
therefore giving the benefit of a reduction in levies’.19  
One of the rules imposed by the papal bull of 1569 in its definition of the census 
consignativus was that the loan had to be backed by ‘an immovable thing, fruitful in its nature’, in 
other words all or part of an estate that generated revenue. Indeed, this was in effect the most 
common practice. Almost all mortgage contracts drawn up in the early modern period concerned a 
plot of cultivated land, with fruit trees, a house, a shop, a mill, or anything that could guarantee a 
revenue stream. This would serve to pay the annual rent to the mortgagee. Real estate ownership, 
and therefore the land itself, became indeed an engine of credit. In 1676, Domenico Rambaldi of 
Verona received a loan of 50 ducats from the lawyer Lorenzo Porta to whom he gave 5 campi of 
land (about 15,200 square metres). 20 This estate had been bought by Domenico and his brother 
shortly before signing the loan contract.21 
The preferred form of collateral was in fact land, which was very meticulously described. 
The contract precisely indicated the property’s borders, the total area, the type of cultivation, and 
the presence of any vines, mulberry trees or other fruit trees that would increase the value of the 
collateral. When comparing the description of the collateral, more specifically the surface area of 
the land, to the sum borrowed, a lack of correlation between the two variables emerges. The total 
amount of farmland mortgaged for a loan of 50 ducats could range from 3 to 24 campi.22 The types 
of terrain could undoubtedly differ depending on to the land’s geographical position and the crops 
grown on it, which affected its productivity. The price of one campo could range from a few dozen 
to hundreds of ducats. Pastoral lands had a higher value, which could increase further if they 
included water, houses, wells, and so on. However, an analysis which compares similar parcels of 
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land (similar in terms of position, crop, surface area, and contractual terms, and therefore 
homogeneous with regard to key variables) with the amount of money loaned shows a clear lack of 
consistency in the relationship between area of land pledged and value of loan.  
Brigida Montresori, widow of Antonio, pledged four campi for a loan of 100 ducats.23 For 
the same sum, Francesco Tegnali pledged more than twice the amount of land, namely 10 campi.24 
In both cases, the land was located in the same area, the interest rate was 6%, and the duration of 
the contract was five years. The difference between the collateral pledged for another 100 ducat 
credit was even more evident; in one case Giovanni Salvador pawned three campi, 25 in another, 
Donato Zucchi offered as collateral 24 campi.26 In these two situations the type of land was the 
same, and for both the interest rate was 6% and the duration three years. The evident difference 
between one loan and the other, where the terms and collateral are the same, serves to convince us 
that there were other elements, apart from the collateral, that contributed to mitigating risk, namely 
trust, reliability and the reputation of the debtor.27 On the other hand, the protagonists of early 
modern societies did not always act according to economic criteria alone. Equity, ‘rational’ 
behaviour, distributive and commutative justice coexisted and interconnected in complex ways. 
Often connections based on money were entwined with personal and blood relations and were also 
strengthened by physical and spiritual proximity.  
Urban residents borrowed against real estate they owned in the city like houses, buildings, or 
shops. In order to obtain a loan of 1,500 ducats from Earl Francesco Montanari, Gio. Battista Turco, 
a member of a noble family from Verona, collateralized his entire palace called San Fermo, in the 
centre of the city.28 In a contrasting example, the widow of an apothecary (speziale) asked for a loan 
of 304 ducats, for which she had to pawn ‘the entire shop, with its implements and everything 
pertaining to the use of the apothecary shop’.29 Not just private citizens but also guilds, institutions 
and organizations resorted to debt. The Jewish community of Verona had to pledge ‘all the houses 
17 
 
and capital that it possessed in the ghetto’ to have a loan of 5,000 ducats from earls and brothers 
Verità and Pietro Zenobi.30 
Real estate had always been favourably viewed in the credit market. Nevertheless, the idea 
of collateral was slowly moving away from its traditional formula and encompassing different types 
of goods. Collateral became more liquid, even going so far as to include revenues like tolls or tithes. 
In 1681, Earl Lorenzo Pullé of Verona took out a loan for 250 ducats, for which he collateralized a 
‘portion of the tithe and the right to levy tithes on grains’.31 Francesco Marogna, who lent 100 
ducats to Giacomo Castorio, received as collateral ‘all the mulberry trees’ that were present on the 
borrower’s estates.32  
In other larger, more entrepreneurial areas like the State of Milan it is clear that the collateral 
used was shaped by an economy that was developing and growing, where agricultural and industrial 
activities, along with an expanding international trade network, were hungry for capital. The 
property that was pledged was therefore further and further detached from real estate and 
increasingly linked to intangible assets like public bonds, tolls, or fiscal revenues. This was the case 
for the merchant and iron entrepreneur Niccolò Cipriani. In 1575, in order to obtain a loan of 7,000 
scudi33 from the banker Marco Antonio Rezzonico, in addition to a beech tree, he pledged a furnace 
(‘forno colandum ferrum’), the revenue from duties on a mill (‘dazio macina’), and the licence to 
use and graze horses in order to ‘cercare vene di metalli’ (search for veins of ore). The loan 
stipulated a 7% interest rate, which Cipriani paid until 1584.34  
Thus, an increasing number of censi began to be backed by government bonds, a feature that 
was due also to the increasing reliance of the State of Milan on public debt around the end of the 
fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century. As Figure 7.1 shows, between 1575 and 1611, 
241 censi contracts for a total amount of 2,116,000 lire were drawn up using state bonds as 
collateral, albeit with different levels of coverage. The interest rates ranged from 7 percent for 20-
year censi to 9 percent for 10-year loans (these were the most common after 1595). To meet the 
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considerable demand for arms in the period from 1575 to 1577, Milanese entrepreneurs were 
encouraged to integrate vertically by opening new mines or reopening old ones: in this way they 
could produce weapons using their own and local iron mineral, joining the different stages of 
production in order to reduce costs and improve efficiency. Because in this industry the quantity of 
fixed assets was negligible and liquidity was necessary in order to buy raw materials and 
individuals parts, having working capital in the form of short-term loans was essential. However, 
when the promised financial assistance from the State failed to materialize, the capital required for 
processing the ore could be obtained only through the censi credit system. Starting in the 1570s, the 
total and average sums of censi gradually rose because they were the only viable way to finance the 
mining of local iron in Valsassina for the war effort; in effect, the first peak of the curve in 1589 
mirrors the boast of weapons demand connected to the geopolitical strategy of the Spanish 
Monarchy, while the second upsurge of the curve during the first decades of the 1600 the borrowers 
were mainly big merchants who used the capital to open silk production facilities.35 In the case of 
Milan, public bonds (which had become especially attractive thanks to the guaranteed payment of 
interest, their alienation rate, easy tradability, and tax exempt status) played the role of matrix of 
credit representing almost the entirety of the mobile assets that censi consignativi borrowers sold to 
lenders as security for loans. So, state securities not only constituted additional income but were 
also used as collateral for credit by the world of industry.  
 
7. 4. Concluding remarks 
 
Under the push of a booming interest in agriculture, which was triggered by the rise of crop prices 
particularly during the mid-sixteenth century, the complex system of lending activities backed by 
real estate in Italy was struck by a wave of radical changes. After centuries in which similar forms 
of mortgage credit coexisted and overlapped - producing also a misleading terminology -, there 
Commentato [CDB6]: This is OK, but could you provide a 
clearer explanation for what is, I think, a specialist economics 
term? we wrote the explanation 
[comment on v2] 
Commentato [CDB7]: =consignativi 
? 
19 
 
slowly began to emerge a refinement of the census consignativus, an instrument that had been in 
use for a long time.  
This was due in large part to the bull of 1569, which laid down the framework and 
introduced some new features: redeemability of the loan, within a defined period of time and which 
favoured the borrower, a modest interest rate, and a full and shared moral legitimacy. Thus emerged 
an instrument that gave a large part of the population access to credit in a more resilient way. All 
that was needed was to own a revenue-generating plot of land or real estate that could be pledged.  
Until now economic history literature has maintained that the main reason for the creation 
and diffusion of this instrument was the need to defend indebted small landowners from an assault 
on their land carried out by the urban elites. Yet, this perspective is more the result of an ideological 
view based on the power imbalance between the city and the countryside, rather than a thesis 
backed by robust empirical evidence. The growth of real estate holdings and the dispossession of 
small farmers occurred by other means. Meanwhile the c. consignativus and its many incarnations 
(during the period of economic expansion beginning in the 1520s in central-northern Italy) acquired 
a structure that was less defensive and less tied to the management of financial emergencies, and 
served more as a driving force that enabled the parties to pay for improvements in soil productivity, 
the setting up of irrigation and drainage systems, infrastructure, and to finance industrial and 
commercial activities. 
The full moral legitimacy, solid legal basis and low interest rate made this kind of lending 
activity the preferred tool of religious institutions, chiefly monasteries and female convents, which 
during this time were among the most important source of credit. The use of censi consignativi 
became increasingly widespread and pervasive, they began to be used to meet the financial needs of 
rural municipalities. Gaining ownership of the mortgaged assets was no longer the primary goal of 
lenders, an increasingly more heterogeneous group, but rather establishing a source of revenue. 
These creditors perfectly attest to the progressive development of a diversified way of making 
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money profitable, which the spread of income generated from public debt also shows. In addition, 
the versatility inherent in the structure of the c. consignativus led to a broadening of the definition 
of collateral to include other types of revenue-generating assets such as public bonds, thus revenue 
went from being property-based to asset-based. Thanks to its simple scaffold, this credit instrument 
went on to become the nexus of the reciprocal interests that determined its success. In effect it 
perfectly permitted the potential complementarity of public finance, private credit and economic 
production (Neal, 2015, p. 43) and the Milanese case fully embodies this, showing how the c. 
consignativus, an instrument born and designed to help and protect the peasant classes, quickly 
turned into a tool that supported economic expansion in manufacturing, trade and infrastructure. 
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1 For an analysis of the Italian agrarian world in the early modern period, see Malanima, 2002, pp. 93-149. 
2 The increasing number of requests to obtain a licence for water use in defined areas was a consequence of the growth 
in farming that characterized many areas of northern Italy, especially the Po Valley region. For the Venetian dominions 
see Lanaro, 1992, p. 247; Ciriacono, 1998. 
3 One ducat equalled six lire and four soldi. 
4 One pertica equalled 654.52 square metres. 
5 Collodo, 1983, p. 20. For the Lombardy area, see Roveda, 2012, pp. 140-150. 
6 Similar situations can be found in rural areas across central and northern Italy, such as Udine, Bassano, Modena and 
Parma (Cattini, 1983, p. 124). 
7 Olive oil was one of the most prized goods exported (passing through Venetian harbours) to northern European 
countries. 
8 Literally ‘metter denaro a livello più di 5.5% se si fondi sopra beni di questa Città e Dogado’, (Pedrinelli, 1768, p. 48).  
9 The bull that finally legitimized interest rate loans was the Vix Pervenit issued in 1745 by Pope Benedetto XIV: 
Vismara, 2004, p. 253. 
10 Literally: ‘asserens se habere ius in re infrascritta ex suis iustis titulis, ex maxime vigour […] de ea facta ab Angelo q. 
Ioannis de Zambellis de Ecclesia Nova ex infrascritto redemptionis manu mea […] Per se heredes suos […] ex nomine 
venditis iure proprio […] dedit, vendit et tradit Paulo fq. Sebastiani a Corubio Stallavena’: Archivio di Stato di Verona 
(hereafter Asvr), Notarial Archive (hereafter N.), notary Agapito Borghetti, f. 1007, 20 January 1591.  
11 In the same example, the relevant text is as follows: ‘Cum pacto perpetuo quandocumque ex sine aliquos temporis 
estintione concesso detto Gio.Maria de redimendo anted. rem vendit ducatos quinquaginta’.  
12 In the seventeenth century the term census replaced the older term mutuum. The latter type of contract had become 
widespread during the thirteenth century, and contributed significantly to medieval economic growth. This tool allowed 
for the growth of the credit market, enabling maritime cities like Genoa to finance commercial and manufacturing 
activities. As noted, the contract clearly stated the amount of money lent, the lien and the deadline. In some mutuum 
contracts the interest rate was added to the final sum that the borrower had to return to the lender, so for example if the 
amount borrowed was 10 dinari, at the end of the contract the debtor had to return 11.5 dinari. In other cases the 
                                                             
22 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
interest rate was clearly stated using the per centum formula (Palermo, 2008, pp. 119-20). The word mutuum, which 
was strictly forbidden from any kind of deed throughout the early modern period, came into use again in the eighteenth 
century, signalling a change in mentality and a different attitude towards money and credit. The idea of money as the 
devil’s excrement (‘sterco del demonio’), as it was called by the Catholic Church, had been overtaken by a new mindset 
that saw money as a key factor for economic growth (Palermo, 2008, p. 120). 
13 The key text is as follows: ‘Annuum redditum creari constituive nullo modo posse, nisi in re immobili aut quae pro 
immobili habeatur, de sua natura fructifera, et quae nominatim certis finibus designata sit. Rursum, nisi vere in pecunia 
numerata, praesentibus testibus ac notario, et in actu celebrationis instrumenti, non autem prius, recepto integro iustoque 
pretio’. (Alonzi, 2005, p. 88). 
14 The borrower continued to pay taxes on the portion of the real estate that had been used as collateral. The contract 
usually contained a clause that clearly stated the debtor’s obligation to pay the gravezze (taxes) on the land. 
15 See for instance the contract drawn up in 1686 by the noble Verità Poeta brothers. They gave (‘per titolo di dà in 
pagamento’) Bartolomeo Peverelli a plot of land in return for 100 ducats that they used for their sister’s dowry. Since 
they did not have the cash to pay him back (‘e non havendo gli stessi il commodo di liberarsi dal detto debito’) they 
ceded (‘pe titolo di dà in pagamento in virtù del loro diretto dominio’) a plot of land; Asvr, N., notary Francesco 
Bernardi, f. 1458, 12 January 1686. 
16 This was in effect a practice common to almost all the regular orders; see Landi, 1996, 2005. For the use of censi by 
the regular orders in Friuli, see Monte, 2000, pp. 253-284. See also the credit activity undertaken by the Dominicans in 
Verona: Lorenzini, 2009, pp. 59-71. 
17 For the original and juridical structure of the livello instrument in the Italian peninsula, see Pertile, 1892. 
18 Asvr, N., notaries: Gio. Francesco Vidali and Domenico Moretti, f. 11.295, 10 February 1681 
19 ‘gratiosa concessione fattali dal Serenissimo Principe nella Parte del dì 10 Giugno 1673 [prevedeva] ch’è di poter 
pigliar denari a censo di 4,5% libero da gravezze per estinguer il capitale per li quali è tenuto pagar il 6% et così goder il 
beneficio delle minorazioni degli aggravi’; quoted in Asvr, N., notary Vincenzo Ferro, f. 5248, 5 June  1676. 
20 One campo equalled 3,047 square metres. 
21 Asvr, N., notary Francesco Bernardi, b. 1428, 17 September 1676. 
22 That means, from 9,000 to more than 73,000 square metres. 
23 Asvr, N., notary Francesco Bernardi, b. 1426, 30 April 1676. 
24 Asvr, N., notary Francesco Bernardi, f. 1428, 26 September 1676. 
25 Asvr, N., notary Nascimbene Bajetta, f. 1532, 16 May 1676. 
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26 Asvr, N., notary Vincenzo Ferro, f. 5246, 7 May 1676. 
27 These constituted in effect the key factors that underpinned early modern credit markets; see Muldrew, 1998. 
28 Asvr, N., notary Filippo Filippini, f. 5143, 7 May 1681. 
29 Literally ‘il negozio intero con utensili e altro al medesimo pertinenti ad uso di speciaria’, Asvr, N, notary Francesco 
Bernardi, f. 1458, 20 March 1686. 
30 Asvr, N, notary Giovanni Bernardi, f. 1681, 24 December 1686. 
31 He mortgaged a ‘porzione di decima et ragione di decimare grani minuti et ogni altra cosa solita decimarsi nella villa 
di San Pier in Carian’: Asvr, N, notaries Gio.Francesco Vidali and Domenico Moretti, f. 11297, 9 October 1681. 
32 Asvr, N, notary Gianfilippo Gianfilippi, f. 6034, 18 December1681. 
33 One scudo equalled six lire imperiali. 
34 Archivio di Stato di Milano, Fondo Commercio, carta 221, f. 16, 12 September 1580. 
35 The silk industry, which included the production of raw silk production and silk cloth, was expanding rapidly during 
the sixteenth century. Much of it was produced for export. The decline of the wool industry in the previous century was 
soon counterbalanced by the expansion of silk manufacturing, which reached its apogee in the mid-sixteenth century in 
several regions of northern Italy. 
